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AlCPA

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue, New York New York 10019 (212)581-8440

June 14, 1974

To Members of the Board of Directors
Members of the
ations with the SEC Subcommittee
Rel
Managing Partners of Firms Having a Substantial
SEC Practice
Chairmen of Auditing and Accounting Divisions
Staff Vice Presidents and Division Directors

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Institute’s
response to the request of the SEC for comment on the
proposal to amend Rule 2(e)(7) to substitute public
disciplinary proceedings for non-public proceedings,
which has been filed with the Commission.
The response has been drafted by a special committee
chaired by Ray Groves, and with the assistance of the
Institute’s legal counsel.

Yours very truly,

W. E. Olson
President

WE0:Ss
Enclosure

June 13, 1974

COMMENTS OF THE
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL TO MEND RULE 2(e)(7)
OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES OF PRACTICE___
(SEC FILE NO. S7-520)
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

respectfully submits these comments on the above subject in
response to the invitation extended by S.A. Release No. 5477.

The Institute is the foremost national representative of the
public accounting profession, whose members, along with those

of the legal profession, would be principally affected by the

proposed change in Rule 2(e)(7) of the Commission's Rules of
Practice.

The Institute's position, in brief, is that the pro

posal to amend Rule 2(e)(7) to substitute public disciplin
ary proceedings for non-public proceedings should not be

adopted.

No substantial consideration of public policy sup

ports such a reversal of present Rule 2(e)(7); and very seri

ous considerations, both of principle and of a practical nature
weigh against it.

In the light of the concentrated considera

tion of the subject stimulated by the proposal we do suggest,

however, that other changes might usefully be made in Rule
2(e)(7):

specifically, we suggest that the Rule be amended

(1) to make clear that all stages of a proceeding short of

- 2 a final adverse determination are non-public; and (2) to

specify that exceptions will be made in particular proceed

ings if, but only if, all respondents so request.
I
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE
PROPOSED CHANGES IN RULE 2(e)(7)
The changes in Rule 2(e)(7) proposed by the Release
are two:

the addition of a prefatory phrase extending the ap

plication of the Rule to "all proceedings," and not just to
hearings; and a diametric change of the Rule’s operative term,
"non-public," to "public."

These changes would indeed, as the

Release states, constitute a "reversal" of the Rule, and of
the unvarying practice with regard to Rule 2(e) proceedings

since the Rule was first promulgated.
Although proceedings brought under present Rule 2(e)
are only presumptively private, since the Commission may on

its own motion or on request of a party direct otherwise, we

understand that in fact no such proceeding has ever been public.
As it presently stands, Rule 2(e)(7) specified only that "hear
ings" shall be non-public; but the practice quite properly has

been to treat as non-public the issuance of the Order for Pro
ceeding as well as all subsequent stages, including appeal to
the Commission, prior to a final determination.

The practice

has also been to treat as non-public the final determination
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in any proceeding where it was favorable to the respondent.
Presumably the usual if not uniform practice under the

proposed Rule would be to make public all aspects of Rule 2(e)
proceedings, from start to finish.

The Commission would still

be empowered to make exception to the usual practice in par

ticular cases, either on its own motion or that of a respondent
but it is presumably contemplated that requests for non-public

treatment (which of course could be expected in virtually
every case) would normally be denied.

There would be no in

dication in the Rule, and there is none in the Release, of the
criteria the Commission would refer to in deciding to make a

matter non-public.

The change from non-public to public would as a prac
tical matter affect only those Rule 2(e) proceedings where
the Commission makes its own original determination of fault

on the part of the professional.

It would not significantly

affect the practice in derivative proceedings, where the im-

*/ The Commission has on occasion published a description of
the facts found in a Rule 2(e) proceeding where the charges
were ultimately dismissed — but without identifying the re
spondent involved. See, e.g., A.S.R. No. 77, February 19, 1954.
There have also been some instances where the Commission an
nounced the dismissal of a 2(e) proceeding and identified the
professional involved, but this has occurred only in instances
where the factual determinations were adverse to the respondent
and the dismissal rested upon a judgment that no 2(e) sanction
was called for. See, e.g., In the Matter of Barrow, Wade,
Guthrie & Co., A.S.R. No. 67, April 18, 1949.

- 4 position of a Rule 2(e) sanction results from a determination

of fault by another tribunal.
In derivative proceedings — that is, those based on

disbarment by other authorities, conviction of a crime, or an

injunction or adverse finding in a civil action brought by

the Commission — the first action taken by the Commission is
the imposition of the sanction of suspension or disbarment,
*/
which is and would in any event be publicized.

The proceedings that would be significantly affected
by the proposed change in Rule 2(e)(7), therefore, would be

original proceedings, where the Commission must before impos
ing sanctions make its own independent findings that the pro

fessional is lacking the "requisite qualifications to repre

sent others," is lacking "character or integrity," has en

gaged in "unethical or improper professional conduct," or has
willfully violated or aided or abetted the violation of the

**

federal securities laws or rules and regulations thereunder.

*/ Suspension or disbarment is automatic under Rule 2(e)(2)
in cases of disbarment by other authorities and of criminal
conviction, and suspension may be imposed without hearing
under Rule 2(e)(3)(i) in civil injunctive proceedings. In
the latter cases, a decision of the Commission is required,
"with due regard to the public interest," but this decision
is made ex parte.
In all cases, in sum, if a sanction is im
posed, it is done without hearing, and there is in practical
effect no difference in time or in substance between the in
itiation of the proceeding and its publicized conclusion.
**/

Rule 2(e)(1).
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As to these proceedings, unlike the derivative ones, the

Commission may not under the Rule impose any sanction until

after an opportunity for hearing.
The principal impact of the proposed changes with re

spect to such original proceedings would result from the Com
mission's making public the Order for Proceeding which for
mally initiates the proceeding.

The phrase "all proceedings,"

in the proposed amendment, is presumably intended to be allinclusive, and to comprehend not only evidentiary hearings but

also motions, arguments before the administrative law judge,

initial decisions and appeals to the Commission.

While tech

nically "public," however, none of these stages would be at

tended by the same kind of publicity as the Order for Pro
Presumably none would, like the initial Order, be
*/
publicized by the Commission itself.
Similarly, we assume,

ceeding.

the records of proceedings, whether pending or concluded,

would also be made accessible to the public.

This is not now

the case except with respect to proceedings which have been

concluded by a determination adverse to the respondent.

How

ever, such records also would not normally be widely publi

cized.

*/ It may be suggested that pending non-public proceedings
sometimes become known because third parties called as wit
nesses necessarily learn of the pendency of the proceedings
in which they testify. However, even if some such leakage is
unavoidable, it is not equivalent to the affirmative, official
widespread publicity that would result from the public an
nouncement of the Commission's Orders for Proceeding.

- 6 Thus, in practical terms, the significant effects of
the proposed change in Rule 2(e)(7) would be two-fold:

first,

and most importantly, it would result in the Commission giving

publicity to the initiation of Rule 2(e) proceedings, and of
the charges laid therein, in all cases where those charges

ultimately were not sustained after a hearing; and secondly,
in those cases where some or all of the charges ultimately were
sustained, it would result in publicity being given to such
charges at an earlier time, and frequently in a different form,

than is the case under the present practice where the Commis
sion's release publicizes only the results of the proceeding.
We submit that neither effect is justified by the Release,
or is otherwise justifiable.
II

THERE ARE COMPELLING CONSIDERATIONS
AGAINST THE PROPOSED CHANGE
In net effect, the proposed Rule 2(e)(7) would con

template the routine imposition of the severe sanction of ad
verse publicity upon the respondent professional prior to any

opportunity for hearing, prior to any decision on the evidence
or the law, and even in cases where a decision favorable to
the respondent is ultimately made

The severity of the sanction stems from the fact that
a professional person's reputation is his most valuable, and

- 7 most fragile asset.

The importance of professional reputa

tion, and its vulnerability to charges of incompetence or want

of integrity, have recently been recognized by Commissioner

Sommer, speaking of the damage that can be done to profes
sionals by litigation:*/
"All of us know of the dramatic and unfortunate
impact any litigation questioning the conduct
of a professional can have on his career, as
well as his finances. Corporations can with
stand legal attacks and go forward to thrive
and not infrequently corporate executives can
do the same. However, it is far more diffi
cult for a professional to retain his commun
ity standing, his self-respect and his financial
security after questions have been raised pub
licly concerning his integrity or his compe
tence ."

Commissioner Sommer went on to say that "the Commission and
its staff must be extremely cautious when it is confronted

with a seeming involvement of counsel in securities miscon**/
duct."
That caution, which is surely called for with
respect to any matter that may give rise to a Rule 2(e) pro
ceeding against any professional, would be abandoned by the

proposed changes in Rule 2(e)(7).
The damage done by publicizing formal charges of pro

fessional incompetence or misconduct, particularly where

*/ A. A. Sommer, "Emerging Responsibilities of Securities
Lawyers", CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,631 at p. 83,692
(January 1974).
**/

Id.

- 8 those charges bear the imprimatur of an agency of the federal
government, is in major part irreparable.

Potential clients

deciding which professional or firm to engage, and young
professionals choosing a firm with which to initiate their

careers, cannot postpone their decisions, and are not likely
to suspend their judgments, until charges against a particular

firm have been adjudicated.

Even where there is ultimate ex

oneration, the fact of exculpation will seldom be as widely

circulated as the charges; and even if it is, it will neither
cure the damage already done nor entirely eliminate the taint
on reputation resulting from the fact that charges once were

made.
*/
As the Wells Committee pointed out,*/
"Commencement of a formal enforcement proceeding
is a matter that is likely to be of very great
consequence to the person or entity named in the
proceeding. If the party named, for example, is
a corporation whose shares are publicly owned or
a large brokerage firm, shareholders, employees
or other persons who are themselves in no way re
sponsible for any unlawful conduct may be ad
versely affected. Moreover, the relief sought
by the Commission, even if granted, may not be
as significant or as onerous a sanction as the
publicity attendant upon the commencement of
the proceeding."
(Emphasis added.)
The Wells Committee was referring to statutory enforcement

proceedings, not proceedings under Rule 2(e), but its

Report of the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Enforce
ment Policies and Practices, BNA Securities Regulation & Law
Report, June 28, 1972, page 9.
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observation concerning the impact of publicity has even greater
force with respect to professional respondents in the latter

proceedings.
Recognition of the irretrievable harm that may be done

to professional reputations by the mere publication of charges
of professional incompetence or misconduct surely underlies
the predominant practice with respect to disbarment of lawyers:

that, until and unless there is an adverse determination —
and often even then, if the sanction is less than disbarment

or suspension — the proceedings are non-public.

In 1970,

a Special Committee of the American Bar Association chaired

by former Justice Clark of the Supreme Court, observed that

this was the majority though not universal rule, and recom
mended that it should become uniform practice.
*/
asserted

The Committee

"Until proof has been adduced that an
attorney has been guilty of misconduct, a
complaint against him is no more than an
accusation. Disclosure of the existence
of that accusation may itself result in
irreparable harm to the attorney. His
practice may be diminished, if not sub
stantially destroyed, by the resulting lack
of confidence of old and new clients, judges
before whom he has to appear and fellow
attorneys with whom he must negotiate."

*/ ABA Special Committee on Evaluation Of Disciplinary Enforce
ment
(June 1970), 95 Reports of the American Bar Association
934-35 (1970).
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The same reasoning, of course, applies to accountants.

Similar considerations, indeed, appear to underlie
the uniform practice of the federal government with respect

to serious disciplinary proceedings against its own employees.

Until recently, hearings with respect to disciplinary charges
were invariably non-public; and the rule now is that an ex

ception will be made only in cases where the employee re
quests that the hearing be public.**/
The impact of the proposed change in Rule 2(e)(7)

would be felt most keenly by those professionals against
whom disciplinary charges ultimately were not sustained.

As

to these, it is difficult to discern the slightest trace of
fairness in a procedure which administers punishment de

spite ultimate formal exculpation.

No comprehensive infor

mation appears to be available as to the number or frequen
cy of Rule 2(e) proceedings in which the charges are ultimate
ly dismissed, but clearly there are some.

Moreover,

*/ See also 31 C.F.R. § 10.90(b) (hearings in disciplinary
proceedings with respect to practitioners before the Treasury
Department may be public if the practitioner requests); In re
Francis J. Charlton, FTC Dkt. No. 129-8, order dated Sept. 18,
1973, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 20,476 at page 20,404 (hearing in
disciplinary action held in camera).
See 5 C.F.R. §§ 771.210(i), 772.305(c)(5); 38 Fed. Reg.
10247 (April 26, 1973). Cf. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d
755 (D.C. Cir. 1972) .
***/ Cf. In the Matter of Myers, A. S. R. No .92, July 16, 1962,
(dismissing charges against an unnamed accounting firm, while
imposing sanctions on the individual respondent); A.S.R. No.
77, February 19, 1954.

- 11 inherent in the Commission’s dual role as accuser and adjudi

cator in Rule 2(e) proceedings is the assumption that some
charges will be brought that prove to be unfounded.
The Commission’s approval, in its prosecutorial role,

of the filing of charges cannot — as a matter of due process —
be tantamount to a decision by the Commission, in its justi

ciating role, that the charges are true.

The exact standards

applied by the Commission in determining whether to approve
a staff proposal for the institution of disciplinary proceed

ings and for determining after hearing whether the charges
have been sustained, are not publicly available; but it is
nonetheless clear that the standard for the first is, or is

meant to be, lower than that for the second.

Thus, speaking

of the decision to initiate administrative proceedings, the
*/
Commission’s Chairman recently observed:*/
"[Y]ou have to remember that we, at this point,
are still administrators, guessing about pos
sibilities and probabilities, not adjudica
tors making findings and drawing conclusions.
The issue is simply this: Does the staff
deserve, and is it in the public interest
to give it, a chance to prove its case?"

It may be that in the majority of Rule 2(e) proceed
ings, the staff’s charges are ultimately sustained.

Even

for this category of cases, however, imposing the sanction

Ray Garrett, Jr., "A Look At The SEC’s Administrative
Practice" (April 25, 1974).

- 12 of publicity at the start rather than the conclusion of the

proceeding would be grossly unfair.

For one thing, punish

ment would occur before any of the due process protections
purportedly extended to respondents could come into play.
For another, the publicity at the commencement of the pro

ceeding would include all charges which the Commission has

decided to give its staff a ’’chance to prove”; the publicity
at the conclusion would pertain only to those charges which

the staff had succeeded in proving.

Surely again, the lat

ter are frequently different from the former.

There is an implication, in the Release’s reference

to the Commission’s "small staff, limited resources, and
heavy responsibility," that the proposed change in Rule 2

(e)(7) is seen as a new and more effective enforcement tool.
This could be true, of course, if the change were viewed

either as a means of punishing by publicity rather than by

formal sanction after hearing; or as offering the threat of
publicity as a means of negotiating more and better consent

settlements, which play so large a part in the Commission’s

enforcement effort.

Although we share the Commission’s con

cern about the size of its staff and budget, we suggest that
the solution to this problem is, as the Wells Committee

recommended, enlargement of the staff and budget — not the

adoption of unfair enforcement techniques.

- 13 -

If the publication of charges before they are proved
is viewed as an enforcement tool in itself, by reason of

its imposing a sanction without the necessity of hearings,
*/
it is obviously improper and unfair.
Applied prior to

hearing, it would make a mockery of the procedural protec
tions supposedly afforded professionals in Rule 2(e) dis
ciplinary proceedings.

If the proposed change is seen as a means of improv
ing the staff’s bargaining position in securing consent or

ders — a bigger stick behind the back — then it is hardly

fairer.

Bargaining for consent orders in Rule 2(e) proceed

ings is now conducted under the threat that a proceeding,

if brought, would be successful.

This presumably means that

where a consent order is secured, the consenting respondent
has concluded that there is a substantial probability that

the evidence of professional misconduct will be such as to

meet the Commission’s standards (whatever they may be) for
the final adverse determination.

Under the Rule as proposed

to be changed, there would only need to be evidence suffi
cient to meet the Commission’s lesser, but undefined, stan

dard for approving an Order initiating Rule 2(e) proceedings
— and the respondent would have no chance to argue that the

*/ See Administrative Conference of the United States,
1973 Annual Report, Recommendation 73-1, "Adverse Agency
Publicity".

- 14 the evidence did not meet that standard.

As a practical

matter, since the respondent would have no way of assessing
the likelihood that a given proceeding would be approved by
the Commission, he would be at the mercy of the staff in such
negotiations.

And the threat which the staff could wield

would no longer be that of an ultimate adverse determina
tion, after hearing, but publicity pure and simple.

It should also be noted that as an enforcement tool
in either of these respects, the publication of charges un
der the proposed amendment of Rule 2(e)(7) would frequently

prove a two-edged sword, by stiffening resistance of pro
fessionals or firms to any compromise.

Unable to judge for

themselves the likelihood that the Commission would approve

particular charges, some respondents might choose to call
what seemed to them the staff’s bluff.

And once a Rule 2(e)

proceeding had been instituted, since a severe sanction
would already have been imposed, the respondent might well

reason that he had little further to lose, and see his only

chance of mitigating the damage already done, in litigating
the proceeding vigorously to the bitter end.

III
NO LEGITIMATE CONSIDERATIONS OF
POLICY JUSTIFY THE PROPOSED CHANGE

We agree with the Commission’s statement in the Release
that "there is considerable public interest in the standards

- 15 required of professionals practicing before it."

We submit,

however, that this interest would be exceedingly ill-served

by the publicizing of charges that have not yet been proven,
and particularly those ultimately unsustained.

If the public’s interest is thought to lie in knowing

what the Commission believes professional standards to be,
and if it is thought desirable to dramatize the Commission’s

views by identifying professionals who have failed to meet
those standards, surely this illumination can be adequately

accomplished by publicizing the results of the proceedings
in which professionals have been duly found wanting.

We sug

gest, however, that the Commission does not need a culprit,

or disciplinary proceedings, as a medium for expressing its
*/
views on such matters.
The Release also suggests that "when sufficient rea
son exists to institute such a proceeding, the public should

be aware of this fact and have available the evidence support
ing and refuting the charges made."

several faults.

This proposition has

First, surely the interest of the public

attaches to the ultimate determination of the issues in a
proceeding, not to the evidence presented on one side or the
*/ Thus, the Commission has in a series of releases made
clear its views about the standards by which the indepen
dence of accountants should be reasoned. E.g., A.S.R. No.
126, July 5, 1972.

- 16 other, which will not be fully accessible to it as a practi

cal matter, and which in any event the public is hardly in a
position to appraise.

Second, the Commission's release an

nouncing its Order for Proceedings under Rule 2 (e), which
would be the event receiving greatest publicity, would not
make the public aware of the evidence supporting the charges;

and certainly not of the evidence refuting them.

And finally,

the reference to "sufficient reason" for instituting a pro

ceeding seems to suggest either (1) that in the Commission's
view there is no real difference between the standards ap
plicable to the institution and to the determination of a pro

ceeding, or else (2) that there is the same degree of public

interest in knowing that there is some evidence to sustain
a charge of misconduct, even though not enough to persuade
a trier of fact, as in knowing when misconduct has been

proven.

To state either proposition is to refute it.
The Release also suggests that making Rule 2(e) pro

ceedings public would serve the interests of those who prac

tice before the Commission.

If this is intended to refer

to the interests of those professionals who become respondents
in such proceedings, it could of course be better dealt with
not by a general rule but instead simply by a rule providing

that where the respondent so requests, a hearing will be pub

lic.

If, on the other hand, such professionals have some
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other, more widely shared interest in learning which of their

colleagues are being subjected to the ordeal of punishment

by publicity before trial, the Release does not suggest what
it is, nor does it occur to us.

The Release also refers to a "considerable public in

terest" in the disciplinary proceedings in which professional

standards are enforced.

If what this means is that there is

an interest in the fact that the Commission is bringing such

proceedings, and thus demonstrating its diligence, surely
this can be satisfied by publishing the results of the pro

ceedings where an adverse determination has been made, or by
publishing statistics with regard to the number of proceed

ings brought and the nature of their ultimate disposition.

If, on the other hand, what is intended to be suggested is
an interest in the disciplinary machinery itself, with a

focus on whether administrative justice is being properly
meted out, we submit that this interest does not outweigh the
very significant interest of professional respondents in

avoiding unnecessary damage to their reputations.

What is perhaps being invoked in this regard is the
tradition in American jurisprudence that court proceedings are
*/
public, particularly in criminal cases, and to a lesser ex
**/
tent in civil cases as well.
Although with respect to
* /

* */

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 77(b).
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criminal trials this tradition rests upon the Sixth Amendment,

which guarantees to the accused a "public trial," it has also
sometimes been justified in terms of an independent public in

terest in knowing that the processes of justice are working
*/
properly.
It may perhaps be thought that there is a simi
lar interest in assuring public confidence in the fairness of
the Commission’s administrative proceedings.

The fact is,

however, that the tradition of public court trials, and the
Constitutional amendment that embodies it, rest upon a re

jection of historical judicial abuses such as the Star Chamber,
and is principally concerned with protecting the rights of a
** /
criminal accused.
We submit that to the extent that there

is an interest in preventing the Commission’s disciplinary
proceedings from taking on the characteristics of the Star

Chamber, this can be quite sufficiently served by giving the

respondent the right to opt for public proceedings.
The Release also suggests that the change in Rule 2(e)

(7) might be justified because it would bring practice under
that Rule into conformity with Rule 11(b), which applies to
all administrative hearings except those under Rule 2 (e).

We

submit that mere abstract symmetry between the rules is a con
sideration deserving no weight at all, and that there is no

*/ See United States v. Consolidated Laundries, 266 F.2d
941, 942 (2nd Cir. 1959); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp.
1077, 1087 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
* */

See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948).
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other reason for adopting the 11(b) pattern in 2(e)(7).
First, unlike Rule 2(e) proceedings, all of the pro
ceedings subject to Rule 11(b) have a statutory basis of

authority; and each of these statutory provisions specifical
ly contemplates public hearings.*/

There is with respect to

Rule 2(e) proceedings no such expression of Congressional in
tent .
Second, all, or virtually all, of the potential re
spondents in such administrative proceedings under Rule 11(b)
are subject to substantial regulation, including disclosure

requirements which expose them to public scrutiny regardless

of whether proceedings are brought against them — which is
not so with respect to the professionals who are subject to
Rule 2(e).

Third, most of the categories of potential respondents

under Rule 11(b) are corporate entities.

Although as the

Wells Committee recognized, even the exposure of corporations

to the publication of charges prior to hearing may do damage

*/ Section 21 of the Securities Act of 1933 mandates a pub
lic hearing, but applies only to hearings involving the suf
ficiency of documents, and not charges of culpability or mis
conduct of individuals or even corporations. All the other
provisions specify without criteria that such hearings "may"
be public: Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 22; Public
Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, Section 19; Trust In
denture Act of 1939, Section 320; Investment Company Act of
1940, Section 41; Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Section
212.
See also ALI Federal Securities Code § 1513(e) (Ten
tative Draft No. 3).
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to innocent persons,

Commissioner Sommer has aptly pointed

out that the potential for damage to professionals as respon**/
dents is much greater.

Fourth, none of the respondents in the proceedings to
which Rule 11(b) applies are professionals in the same sense
as lawyers and accountants.

To be sure, some respondents are

individuals, or partnerships — for example, brokers and

dealers.

Even though not members of a learned profession,

they too may suffer significant damage to reputation as the

result of the mere publication of charges.

Yet apparently

in recognition of this factor, according to the Wells Com

mittee report, the Commission has usually exercised its auth
ority under Rule 11(b) in proceedings involving brokers and
*** /
dealers, to make them non-public.
If the Wells Committee
was correct, and continues so, on this point, then the pro
posed change in Rule 2(e)(7) would not really bring the prac

tice with respect to non-corporate respondents under Rules
2(e) and 11(b) into conformity unless it is proposed that

the Commission abandon its practice of having most hearings
involving brokers and dealers non-public, or else it is in-

*/

See page 8, supra.

**/

See page 7, supra.

***/

Wells Committee Report, Note page 8 supra, at page 12.
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tended that despite the proposed change in Rule 2(e)(7)
most Rule 2(e) proceedings will continue to be private.

We

note, in this regard, that the disciplinary proceedings of
the self-regulatory bodies having jurisdiction over brokers

and dealers — that is, the Exchanges and the NASD — are
*/
invariably non-public.

Finally, a few words should be said about another
of the Commission’s enforcement tools — namely, civil in

junctive actions.

The Commission has increasingly named

professionals, both accountants and lawyers, and their firms,

among the defendants in such actions; and appears to regard
injunctive proceedings as an alternative to disciplinary pro
ceedings (or as a means of securing dual relief in a single

proceeding through invocation of Rule 2(e) (3) (i)) in dealing

with professional malfeasance.

The relationship between the two kinds of proceed
ings raises some fundamental questions which are beyond the

scope of the present comments — for instance, as to what
the criteria should be by which a decision is made to proceed

in one fashion rather than the other;

as to the comparative

weight of evidence necessary for the Commission to authorize
*/ It is noteworthy that the proposed National Securities
Market System Act of 1974, recently passed by the Senate,
clearly contemplates that such disciplinary proceedings by
self-regulatory bodies will remain non-public unless and un
til an adverse determination has been made. See, S. Rep.
No. 93-865, p. 22; S.2519, Sec. 19(d).

- 22 the institution of each; and as to the balance presented by
each mode between protection of public interests and pro

cedural assurances of fairness to the defendant/respondent .
The point requiring discussion here is that where an injunc
tive action is brought against a professional, the complaint

itself, with its unanswered and unproven charges, is pub
licly announced by the Commission just as an Order for Pro

ceeding under Rule 2(e) would presumably be routinely an
nounced if the change under discussion were adopted.

Such

publicity, of course, carries the same potential for damag

ing the professional defendant as that which would occur un
der a revised Rule 2(e)(7).

Whether the damage is greater

with one sort of proceeding or the other may well be mooted:
on the one hand, a lawsuit is likely to be more widely re
ported in the press than a Rule 2(e) proceeding; on the

other hand, the charges laid in a Rule 2(e) proceeding —

of professional incompetence or misconduct serious enough to
warrant forfeiture of the right to practice — may be more
grave than a charge of having violated a complex regulatory

statute.
In any event, the fact that civil injunctive actions

are thought by the Commission to be available as an alterna

tive means of achieving the same purposes as Rule 2(e) pro
ceedings , and the fact that they are ordinarily highly publi

cized from the very start, may raise the question whether
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Rule 2(e) proceedings should not be equally publicized.

The

answer, we submit is no.
In the first place, as has already been discussed, the

fundamental reasons of policy underlying the American tradi
tion that court proceedings are public could, to the extent
that they are applicable to administrative disciplinary pro
ceedings, be adequately served by giving the respondents a right
*/
to require the hearings to be made public.*/

In the second place, the general tradition of public

court proceedings does not encompass any immutable require

ment that the identity of parties be made publicly known,
let alone that they be highly publicized.

There is, indeed,

a tradition of anonymous designation of parties, in both crim
inal proceedings**/ and civil ones,***/ where public identifi

cation may result in unnecessary damage to reputation or
As to disciplinary proceedings by courts against
****/
attorneys, Judge Cardozo observed:

humiliation.

"There is a practice of distant origin by which
disciplinary proceedings, unless issuing in a
judgment adverse to the attorney, are recorded
as anonymous."

We recognize that in injunctive actions in which pro
fessionals are named as defendants there are ordinarily a

*/

See pp. 17-18 supra.

* */ See, e.g., Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287
(1959) (contempt conviction).

* **/ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (class action challenging
constitutionality of abortion laws).
* ***/ People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E.
478, 492-93 (1928).
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variety of other defendants as well.

In light of this, it

would doubtless be impractical to designate the professional

defendants pseudonymously, and an end to the practice of pub

licizing complaints might mean the loss of some legitimate
benefits (of which we assume that simple punishment by publicity

is not thought to be one).

We are not, therefore, suggesting

here that the Commission’s practice with regard to court pro
ceedings be changed.

We do, however suggest that there is no

good reason for importing those practices into disciplinary

proceedings, where only professionals are respondents; and

where the damage done by publicity is most acute and least
justified.
IV

OTHER CHANGES IN RULE 2(e)(7)
WHICH WOULD BE DESIRABLE
Although as explained above, we oppose the principal

change in Rule 2(e)(7) on which comment has been invited, our
study of that Rule in the preparation of these comments has

suggested some other changes in Rule 2(e)(7) which we take this

opportunity to commend to the Commission's consideration.
First, we suggest that the prefatory phrase proposed

in the Release, to make Rule 2(e)(7) apply to all proceed
ings, and not merely hearings, should be adopted.

It is the

present practice to treat all aspects of the proceeding as

non-public.

We believe it would be desirable to confirm this

practice in the Rule itself.

- 25 Second, we suggest that a respondent should have a
right to have a proceeding public if he wishes it to be.

In

deed, respondents probably already have such a right, en
forceable by court action:*/
nized in the Rule.

we suggest that it be recog

That right should be subject to limita

tion only in cases where there is more than one respondent,
and one or more of the respondents desires that the proceed**/
ing be non-public. In such a case the interest in protecting
professional reputation against damaging publicity should

override the interest in publicity.

We suggest that Rule

2(e) (7) be changed to spell this out.

Third, we suggest eliminating entirely the authoriza
tion for the Commission to require any proceeding to be pub
lic except where requested by the respondent.

We have not

conceived of any case where it would be appropriate for the

Commission to require a proceeding to be public.

And, as

has been pointed out, the Commission has never exercised its

present authority to make one public.

Finally, if these changes were adopted, it would also
be appropriate to make clear in the Rule that final adverse

*/

See Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

**/ Cf. ALI Federal Securities Code § 1513(e)(1)
tive Draft No. 3).

(Tenta
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would continue to be made public, as under present practice;
and that in such cases the record of the proceeding would,
again as in present practice, be made public.

If amended in accordance with the foregoing sugges

tions, Rule 2(e)(7) would read as follows:
"(7) All proceedings pursuant to paragraph
(e) of Rule 2, including any hearings held
therein, shall be non-public unless all re
spondents request that any such proceeding
be public, in which case such request will
be granted. An order of the Commission im
posing sanctions, or sustaining charges
against a respondent, may at the Commission's
discretion be made public, in which event the
record of the proceeding will also be made
public."

CONCLUSION
The changes in Rule 2(e)(7) proposed by the Release

would represent a sharp departure from the prior uniform
practice of the Commission, and from the general practice of

other agencies in analogous proceedings involving disciplinary
actions against professionals.

They would, by publicizing

the charges of professional incompetence or misconduct be

fore hearing and adjudication, impose a severe sanction
against the

professional respondent, of damage to reputa

tion which would frequently be irreparable.

The result would

be unfair, unjustified by any legitimate consideration of
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public interest, and very possibly counterproductive.

We therefore urge the Commission not to approve the
changes proposed in the Release.

